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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
~

I. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 58-37-2(1)(g) YIELDS ABSURD RESULTS,
HAS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, AND REQUIRES THIS COURT TO
APPLY AN INTERPRETATION THAT AVOIDS THE ABSURD AND
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE STATUTE.

~

The City correctly points out that under standard rules of statutory construction
this Court will attempt to give effect to legislative intent by first looking to the plain and
ordinary language of a statute. Brief for Appellee City of St. George, 21-25 (hereinafter
"BACSG")(citing Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, 267 P.3d 863).
The City then proceeds to review U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1 )(g) and concludes the language is
unambiguous and clear and therefore "there is one correct way to interpret the statute."
Id. The City goes further by contending this Court should tum a blind eye to the absurd

~

results and constitutional concerns created by a disjunctive reading of the statute purely
on the claim the statute is clear and unambiguous. Id. at 25-33. However, in taking this
approach, the City completely ignores previous rulings relating to impact absurd results
have on the interpretation of a statute and concerns with constitutionality.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a statute's plain language creates

vP

an absurd, unreasonable, or inoperable result, we assume the legislature did not intend
that result." State v. J.M.S., 2011 UT 75, <Jl27, 280 P.3d 410. The Utah Supreme Court
continued in stating, "[i]n applying this canon of construction, we have recognized the
delicate line between 'refraining from blind obedience to the letter of the law that leads to
patently absurd ends and avoiding improper usurpation of legislative power through
judicial second guessing of the wisdom of a legislative act." Id. The control imposed by

1

the court to help navigate that "delicate line" is by limited the application of this rule to
those situations where "a plain language interpretation is so absurd that the 'legislature
11

could not have possibly intended' it. Id.
J.M.S. does not stand alone in the Utah Supreme Court's caution towards a blind

application of the plain language of a statute. In LP/ Servs. v. McGee, the Utah Supreme
Court provided that "[w]hen the plain meaning of the statute can be discerned from its
language, no other interpretive tools are needed. However, 'a court should not follow the
literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result."' 2009 UT 41,
<J[l 1, 215 P.3d 135.
Under this approach to statutory interpretation and construction the analysis does
not end merely because the language is purportedly clear and unambiguous. The district
court acknowledged as much in its opinion where it explained that the

11

absurdity

doctrine ... has nothing to do with resolving ambiguities, but which is applied 'to reform
unambiguous statutory language where applying the plain language leads to results so
overwhelmingly absurd no rational legislator could have intended them." R. at 638 n.6
(citing Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75, <J[46, 357 P.3d 992). The question of
whether that language results in absurd results remains and even prevails in the face of
otherwise clear and plain language. To that end, the City is in error to contend that "the
absurd results ... canons do not apply in the absence of ambiguity. As can be seen from the
aforementioned language, where that language renders patently absurd results this Court
is not only within its prerogative to turn from the purported clear and unambiguous
language but is required to do so.

2

It should be noted at this point that to date no one has suggested that a disjunctive
\@

reading does not in fact create the very absurd results complained of. They cannot, for a
disjunctive reading creates the legal and factual reality of criminalizing a wide swath of
innocent and common items, and the federal cases relied upon by Mike's Smoke Shop
provide ample evidence of this fact. Instead, the City and to some extent the district court,
attempt to side-step this issue by asserting that people are not being prosecuted for any of
the unintended substances caught up in the disjunctive reading. BACSG at 33-34 and R.
at 638 n.6.
For example, the City attempts to make the enforcement of the absurd results
appear absurd in and of itself when it asks this Court to "[i]magine a drug task force
raiding the comer market and bagging energy drinks and Doritos as evidence while
hauling the unsuspecting shopkeeper down to the station to book on drug charges."
BACSG at 33. While Mike's agrees that the likelihood of a drug task force taking down

~

the wily suppliers of Doritos is low; Mike's contends the possibility of such an operation
aimed at energy drinks is very much in the realm of possibility given the fact that they
have been directly linked to deaths by the FDA, have caused a rash of health issues
requiring emergency care, and target youth--all factors which contributed to spice being
targeted. See R. at 269-296.
In 2011 it was reported that energy drink popularity was soaring and "that surge
has also been seen in visits to hospital rooms due to related health issues such as heart
arrhythmias, hypertension, and dehydration." R. at 291. Indeed, in a study relied upon in
that article, ER visits resulting from energy drink consumption between 2005 and 2009
3

peaked at 16,000 in 2008. Id. Young people between the ages of 18 and 25 were
disproportionately represented. Id. at 291-92. What is more, when energy drinks are
combined with alcohol or drugs "the risk of significant, even life-threatening events
increases." Id.
Those concerns were echoed by the FDA in a 2013 report which indicated "[t]he
U.S. energy drink industry has grown rapidly since the drinks were first introduced. R. at
269. This is in part thanks to "aggressive marketing" which has made energy drinks
"particularly popular among adolescents." Id. The FDA is more explicit in its health
impacts analysis explicitly citing Monster Energy drinks as "implicated in the deaths of
five individuals" and 5-Hour Energy drinks as having "possible involvement in another
thirteen deaths. Id. at 271. The health consequences are even more serious when the
energy drinks are mixed with alcohol, yet national data indicates that some "26% of high
school seniors consumed an alcoholic beverage containing caffeine during the past year.

11

Id. at 273.

The articles relating to energy drinks and their health impacts are startling.
Nevertheless, these drinks remain widely available to all ages and from virtually any
store. Accordingly, while the City may find the image of a drug task force taking down a
purveyor of energy drinks far-fetched, or perhaps even humorous, Mike's does not share
in the sentiment. The simple fact is, given the health consequences of the drinks, they
probably should be regulated. An enterprising city or prosecutor awakening to that fact
may very well seek enforcement through the most applicable statute currently available-the analog statute.
4
r\
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What is more, is that substances not normally intended to be caught up in the
@

controlled substances statutes are in fact now covered, including tobacco and alcohol.
Those substances have well documented severe health consequences to the public at
large. Is it really so far out of the realm of possibility that providers of these substances
may be targeted by a city or prosecutor seeking to stem those health consequences in
their respective jurisdiction? When one considers this case arises from spice, a substance

I~
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which pales in comparison to the impacts of tobacco and alcohol, one can readily see how
the targeting of tobacco and/or alcohol is not far-fetched.
However, to focus on whether prosecution is likely for the purveyors of energy
drinks or MSG laced Doritos is a red herring. The doctrine of absurdity does not ask
whether the absurd results are actual prosecution for otherwise innocent activities, but
rather whether the impact is the criminalization of said activities. In other words, even if
not prosecuted, does an disjunctive reading of U.C.A. § 58-37-2(l)(g) factually render

Q>

every day Utahns into felons? It does.
Put another way, should we consider a dealer of cocaine who is never caught or
prosecuted as not being a felon routinely engaged in criminal activity? Does the behavior
only become criminal upon prosecution? Obviously not. While a conviction may be
necessary for the impacts of a felony to attach to the individual, the lack of prosecution
does not remove the illegality of the act(s)

1
•

1

@

While understanding that the interplay between religion and the law is sensitive, one
cannot ignore the reality that Utah is made up of a substantial number of members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. A religion which espouses as a core belief
"in being subject to kings, presidents, rulers, and magistrates, in obeying, honoring, and
5

It is perhaps for this reason that courts have long held that "no one may be
required at peril of life, liberty, of property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes." Lanzetta v. State of N.J., 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). While this language is
typically applied to vagueness issues relating to statutes, the principle is valid in the
present context of absurdities. This is because there is no vagueness as to whether a
disjunctive reading criminalizes a host of mundane and innocent substances as by its
clear language it does. Rather, the issue is whether the public at large should bear the risk
that their innocent activities, now criminalized, may one day be prosecuted. It is absurd
that a clerk selling 5-Hour energy should daily run the risk of prosecution for a felony
offense--even if that clerk, after considerable interruption to his life, considerable
expense on minimal funds, and extreme stress can manage to defeat the charges on an
unconstitutional as applied challenge, for the clerk should never have born the burden to
begin with.
The salient point is this, the City, the district court, and a host of federal courts,
have all recognized that a disjunctive reading factually and legally makes mundane and
otherwise innocent products a controlled substance analog. In turn, a disjunctive reading
will make a vast portion of the Utah population felons-in-fact. The City asks this Court to

sustammg the law. 12th Article of Faith. https://www .lds.org/scriptures/pgp/a-off/1.11 ?lang=eng (emphasis added). This tenant of faith is not tied to prosecutions or raids
by task forces but rather by a personal accountability to God. In this sense, the
criminalization of everyday common items is objectionable to a good proportion of the
citizens of the State as it invites and perhaps even necessitates the violation of the law in
contravention to a core religious belief. It is absurd to think that the legislature, itself
likely made up of numerous practicing LOS members, intended a result that would be so
offensive to the practices and beliefs of the dominate religion in the State.
11

6

blindly permit this consequence to remain under the guise that it is the will of the
~

legislature. Such is not the case. The results are so absurd, so far reaching, and so severe,
the legislature could not have possibly intended it. As a result, this Court should not
11

afford "blind obedience to the letter of the law" nor follow the literal language" of the
statute given the patently and undeniable absurd consequences such a reading would
render. A conjunctive reading is necessary to both permit prosecutions of analogs to
continue while avoiding the absurdity that follows from a disjunctive interpretation.
II. THE CITY NEVER MADE ANY FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT MIKE'S
OR ITS EMPLOYEES EVER REPRESENTED OR INTENDED XLR-11 TO
HAVE A SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR PHARMOCOLOGICAL EFFECT TO
AM-694 AND NO ELEMENT OF SCIENTER IS REQUIRED OR MET.

The City contends that "[t]here was substantial evidence to show Mike's
@

knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute ... " BACSG at 34. The City then equates evidence of possession with intent to
distribute with U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1 )(g)'s requirement that the defendant "represented or
intended [the substance] to have" a "substantially similar" pharmacological effect as a
controlled substance (in this case AM-694). The City does so by pointing to a single non-

~

binding, non-majority, statement of Justice Roberts wherein he states "a person's lack of
knowledge regarding the legal element can be a defense.

11

BACSG at 35 (citing

McFadden v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2308 (2015)(Roberts, C.J., concurring)).2 The City

2

It should also be noted here that the City points out the U.S. Supreme Court did not
address the issue of whether the federal analog law is properly read in the conjunctive or
disjunctive and therefore the matter "remains unresolved." BACSG at 35 n.14. While the
U.S. Supreme Court did not address the issue, that does not mean the matter is
unresolved. As indicated in the Appellant's Opening Brief, there has been absolute
7

then makes a final step by taking Justice Robert's statement and concluding that means
the analog law contains a scienter requirement (i.e. the knowledge and intent not just of
the act, but that the act is illegal). Id. However, this runs absolutely contrary to Utah law
and in particular Utah law relating specifically to spice and the analog law.
In State v. Arghittu, this Court was asked to consider a number of issues relating to
the spice chemical AM-2201 as a controlled substance analog of another spice chemical,
JWH-018. 2015 UT App. 22, 'Il27, 343 P.3d 709. One such issue was whether the
defendant's lack of knowledge was to the illegality of AM-2201 as a controlled substance
analog was a defense. This Court held:
Arghittu may have believed that AM-2201 was not illegal because it was
not specifically listed in section 58-37-4.2. However, in light of AM-2201 's
potential to qualify as a controlled substance analog under section 58-37-2,
such a belief would have constituted a mistake of law, which in most
circumstances is no bar to criminal liability. See State v. Steele, 2010 UT
App 185, 'Il 30, 236 P.3d 161 ("'[A] good faith or mistaken belief that one's
conduct is legal does not relieve a person of criminal liability for engaging
in proscribed conduct."' (quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law§
137 (2008))).
Id.

Based on the decision in Arghittu, a person being prosecuted for possessing with
intent to distribute a controlled substance analog cannot raise the defense of ignorance as
to the illegality of the substance. Accordingly, so long as the defendant knowingly and
intentionally possessed the substance, even if truly believing the substance to be legal, he

uniformity in the federal courts interpreting the statute in the conjunctive. This uniformity
stretches across multiple circuits and districts. To suggest the matter is unresolved is to
suggest there is still some ongoing debate. There is none. Hence the Governments
assumption in McFadden that the statute was properly read in the conjunctive.
8

is guilty of the offense. This completely removes the scienter component the City asserts
@

saves U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1)(g) as a disjunctive statute.
The City's error as to scienter requirement is echoed in its claims that it found
Mike's represented or intended XLR-11 to have a substantially similar pharmacological

I.;}

effect as AM-694. There is no such finding.
Indeed, the City lists a series of facts it claims are supported by substantial
evidence and which it purports proves Mike's represented and/or intended XLR-11 to be
substantially similar to the pharmacological effects of AM-694. BACSG at 39-40. In
addition to those facts are the Findings the City made as detailed in its Findings of Facts,
Conclusions and Order. R. at 42-49. Finally, the City also has a series of police reports
detailing conversations with Mike's employees concerning the purchase and sell of spice
containing XLR-11. R. at 59-173.
Nowhere in those facts and reports does any employee claim XLR-11 would
~

create a substantially similar pharmacological effect on a person as AM-694. Nowhere in
those facts and reports does any employee assert or acknowledge that he or she intended
XLR-11 to have a substantially similar pharmacological effect as AM-694. Indeed, the
closest acknowledgement is one employee's assertion that on one occasion he tried spice
(he does not indicate what chemical(s) were present in the spice nor what the
pharmacological effects were other than to say it made him sick), and that he knew one or
more people were ingesting spice (again without any representation as to what chemicals
were in the spice or what pharmacological effects were being manifested). R. at 71 and

9

108-109. Consequently, the City has no evidence of any kind that Mike's intended or
represented XLR-11 to have a substantially similar pharmacological effect as AM-694.
It is important to note here that the comparison is between the alleged analog and
the specific controlled substance the alleged analog is being compared to. See Arghittu,
2015 UT App. 22 (comparing the specific similarities between AM-2201 and JWH-018).
Since the City lacks that evidence and now wants to reverse engineer its decision
in case it was wrong on its statutory interpretation, the City attempts to shift the focus to
what it believes is evidence that Mike's intended to possess and distribute spice. Since
Mike's does not contest the factual findings actually made by the City for purposes of this
appeal, Mike's will adopt the position that there is substantial evidence it possessed spice
with the intent to deliver it. In the end, it is of no import. The requirement is clear, the
defendant must have represented or intended XLR-11 to have a substantially similar
pharmacological effect as AM-694. Accordingly, for purposes of determining whether
XLR-11 is an analog it matters not that it was being possessed for later delivery. Rather,
it matters what the intent or representations were as to pharmacological effect. In that
respect, the City lacks any factual findings and any evidence from factual findings could
be derived.
Consequently, should this Court agree that U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1)(g) must be read in
the conjunctive, the City's findings will only apply to one of the three prongs where at
least two prongs are required. As a result the City's findings and conclusions must be
reversed.

IO

CONCLUSION
Treating each subpart of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-2(1 )(g) as a stand-alone
subpart yields absurd results. These results criminalize vast numbers of otherwise
mundane and innocent products, but more importantly, factually and legally makes felons
of the substantial portion of Utahns. The City's attempt to hide behind the lack of
prosecution over the last couple of years does nothing to change the status of everyday
Utahns as habitual violators of the law. Nor does it remove Utahns from bearing the risk
of prosecution. The results are absurd to a startling degree. So much so that the
legislature could not have intended it.
Under such circumstances, even in the face of clear and unambiguous language to
~

the contrary, this Court must depart from the literal language and afford the statute an
interpretation that avoids the absurd results and avoids constitutional concerns. In the
present case, this Court has the benefit of guidance in federal case law which sets forth
the manner in which this is to be accomplished--a conjunctive reading. By reading the
statute in the conjunctive, this Court still gives effect to the legislative intent of

~

prosecuting analog substances while avoiding the appallingly absurd results that stem
from a disjunctive reading.
Additionally, the City's reliance on a scienter requirement is misplaced and does
not save U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1)(g). Knowledge of the illegality of an analog is no defense.
The City has never made any actual findings, nor does it possess any evidence that
could support any findings, that XLR-11 has a substantially similar pharmacological

11

effect as AM-694. Accordingly, when U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1 )(g) is read in the conjunctive,
the City's revocation cannot stand.
Finally, while the City wants to focus solely on the case at hand, this Court will set
a precedent when determining how U.C.A. § 58-37-2(1 )(g) is interpreted. That precedent
will determine if the statute is conjunctive or disjunctive as to all analog cases. It cannot
be changed on whim to accommodate one case over another. If it is di sjunctive here, it is
disjunctive as to all analog substances. Therefore, it is wholly appropriate for this Court

•

to consider the far reaching and long term ramifications of rendering a disjunctive
reading to the statute. Under such considerations, a conjunctive reading is more

•

appropriate.
For the foregoing reasons, Mike's respectfully requests this Court find that U.C.A.
§ 58-37-2(1)(g) be read in the conjunctive and that the City's revocation be reversed.

DATED this 27th day of June 2016.

•
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Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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